A new N-doctrine

The Obama administration appears unsure on its nuclear posture — and disarmament The strategic community worldwide is agog with excitement about the contents of the Nuclear Posture Review

(NPR) to be released soon by the Obama government, but long overdue. The usual convention is for new American administrations to declare their NPR soon after taking office. An additional

reason for the current interest in the Obama NPR is the upcoming review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in May. The NPT is currently in crisis, partly due to the

aberrant behaviour of North Korea and Iran that have relentlessly pursued their nuclear option despite pledging to forsake it as non-nuclear members of the NPT. However, the non-nuclear

weapons states are quite disillusioned with the snail’s pace at which the nuclear weapons states are proceeding towards eliminating their nuclear weapons as pledged in the NPT, though a

start has been made with the Start-2 understanding between US and Russia. The NPR’s contents will influence the deliberations at the NPT review conference in dealing with these crises.

Therefore, the current delay in releasing Obama government’s NPR conveys its own message, especially after his epochal declarations to strive for the elimination of nuclear weapons to

achieve a ‘global zero’. What the delay informs is that the issues in controversy, involving several adjuncts of the US administration, have not been resolved. These vested interests include

the Pentagon, the state department, the intelligence agencies, and the weapons laboratories; all of them have a vital stake in the shape and size of the American nuclear arsenal. What are

the issues exercising these entities and which is delaying the NPR? Quite apart from the question of reducing the size of the nuclear arsenal, the basic issue troubling them is how to

redefine the role of nuclear weapons. It is necessary here to suggest the obvious —  that nuclear weapons serve the ends of deterrence and defence. The difficult questions which then arise

are when they should be used or their use threatened. Should a deterrent posture be adopted declaring that they would be used pre-emptively to prevent a nuclear or conventional attack? Or

only used in a retaliatory mode to inflict condign punishment on the aggressor? Either posture has its implications for arms control and nuclear disarmament. The threat of pre-emptive use

suggests an aggressive posture, which does not square with the non-use predilections of the pacifists. A defensive posture, on the other hand, premised on using nuclear weapons after being

attacked, requires a first strike to be absorbed before retaliating, which is anathema to strategists. Any decision in this regard has implications for weapons acquisitions and the alert

status of the nuclear arsenal. So, what is the optimal posture to be adopted? There are other conundrums that arise in using nuclear weapons for purposes of deterrence or defence. It would

be excessive to suggest recourse to nuclear weapons at the earliest available opportunity. The patent absurdity of this posture was dramatised during the Cold War era by posing the

rhetorical question whether nuclear weapons should be used by Nato when the first Soviet soldier crossed the East-West divide in Germany or at some other time.  If, on the other hand, it is

argued that nuclear weapons should only be used as the last option, then what is that option? Again, in the Cold War context, it was rhetorically asked whether the last option arose when the

Soviets had overrun Germany, or when they reached the English Channel, or when they had invaded England.  So, when should nuclear weapons be used if deterrence fails and their use in

defence is required? Other dilemmas intrude now. Would nuclear weaponsbe used to deter or defend against chemical or biological weapons? Existing international conventions prohibit the

production, stockpiling and use of these weapons; hence the argument has been pressed that chemical and biological weapons can only be deterred and defended against with nuclear weapons.

Incidentally, this is current US policy. Furthermore, the use of nuclear weapons is pledged by the United States if its allies like Japan and South Korea are attacked to provide ‘extended

deterrence’. Arms control lobbies urge that such an extensive set of circumstances permitting the United States to use nuclear weapons severely erodes the goal of eliminating nuclear

weapons. On the other hand, the strategic lobby argues that, should the US weaken its commitment to provide ‘extended deterrence’ to its allies, they might exercise their own nuclear option

on security considerations. No wonder, that the Obama administration finds itself between a rock and a hard place. The internal debates into these seminal questions are delaying promulgation

of the Obama NPR. But its decisions on these difficult issues would define its commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons; this will shape the course of the NPT Review Conference, the

future of the non-proliferation regime, and the prospects for nuclear disarmament.